Lebanese Reactions to Qantar's Release

My friends and I were in a pub this evening when Samir Qantar spoke.

I wanted to see and listen to the speak, but the pub owner intentionally turned off the television to prevent just such viewing and conversations.

Regardless, friends arriving late (which is expected in Lebanon), told us about the contents of the speech. I apologize to all those offended, but I was not expecting much. Samir Qantar was imprisoned in his teens. Unlike most of my friends, who doubt Qantar's intellectual capabilities based merely on his presentation, I am willing to give the man a second chance. According to al-Akhbar, he reads the Arabic press on a daily basis.

Regardless, the man has been imprisoned for years, and has not been honing is speech making abilities. If any, Qantar in Naqoura looked surprised by his reception. He truly appreciated the welcome he received.

Unfortunately, Lebanon does not provide much more than this day to him. Hezbollah might try to nominate him for a parliamentary seat, but his speech today manifests that he must take a few years to practice his political skills. Obviously, this is a man who has been imprisoned since his teens. If Antoine Zahra and Gebran Bassil have trouble giving proper interviews to a perspicacious Lebanese interviewer, imagine what the Lebanese media would do to Qantar.

Prisoners in Helicopter

The 5 former prisoners are getting in a helicopter on the way to the Beirut Airport.

None of the prisoners spoke to the crowd in Naqoura.

Return Celebration Occuring in Naqoura

The 5 former prisoners are wearing Lebanese Army uniforms. None these people fought for the Lebanese Army when they were caught, thus their uniforms suggest an coordinated effort to brand this event as one that unifies Lebanon.

The international media is heavily covering the events. The events in Lebanon are getting far more coverage than on the Israeli side. The jubilation on the Lebanese side is being compared with the somber tone on the Israeli side.

No live prisoners were returned to Israel.

5 Prisoners Back in Lebanon

The five Lebanese prisoners are in Lebanon. Soon, they will take a helicopter to Beirut to meet:

the Lebanese President,

Prime Minister,

Speaker of Parliament,

Lebanese cabinet,

the heads of all branches of Lebanese security and intelligence services,

other Lebanese leaders and dignitaries,

the Iranian Ambassador,

the German Ambassador,

the commander of UNIFIL,

and others.

Qantar is a Criminal

I am glad that the Lebanese in Israeli prisons will be returned to Lebanon.

The soldiers captured in the 2006 war were pawns in Hezbollah's scheme, and it is good that they will return to their families. However, Samir Qantar is a different story.

It is true: many Lebanese who committed horrific crimes during the civil war should be imprisoned. The murderers of Sabra, Shatila, Bhamdoun, Souk al Garb, Damour, Tell al Zaater, the wars of the camps, and more go unpunished. However, few of those civil war crimes were specifically identified. Individual A was never accused of being guilty of killing Victim B.

Regarding Samir Qantar, the crime is evident. Qantar killed Israeli government personnel and civilians during a raid in the middle of a war. However, he also killed a four year old girl by smashing a rock into her head. There is no excuse on Earth to justify that action, and there is no way that I can ever say that this man is a hero. Any man willing to smash in the head of a 4 year old child with a rock should remain in prison for the rest of his life.

My disgust has no words... My tears...

War is horrible. Horrible things happen. Many of the most horrible events go undocumented. When horrendous events are documented, one has a moral duty to take those issues into account. If one does not, one is morally worse than his enemy and spiritually bereft. Any moral arguments for war and a righteous cause evaporate when one accepts disgusting, horrendous, reprehensible acts as normal, or even heroic.

Now, we hear in al-Akhbar newspaper that Hezbollah wants Qantar to run for parliament. Obviously, Druze leader and PSP chief Walid Jumblatt might oppose this. However, Qantar might run with Hezbollah's support.

Nothing would say more about Hezbollah's ethics than for them to nominate Qantar. The party claims moral legitimacy, but their actions defy their rhetorical claims.

New Cabinet: Not that Great

I'm glad there is a new Lebanese government (for information on political affiliation, see NOW Lebanon. However, their data is not entirely correct. For example, they list both Ibrahim Shamsedine and Tarek Mitri as Information Minister). I am not happy with the cabinet composition.

Last year, Michael Young predicted in the Daily Star that if Saad Hariri wanted to assume the office of prime minister, he would be forced to appoint a cabinet of ministers composed of major sectarian political players from different regions in Lebanon. Although Saad is not PM, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet seems to have this composition, which is a major disappointment.

The good:

1. Ziad Baroud, Minister of Interior. Baroud brought together a diverse and encompassing group to create a new electoral law for Lebanon that represents minority and majority interests from all different perspectives. The law is infeasible in Lebanon's current climate, but sets the standard for humane, ethical, and equitable democratic representation in Lebanon.

I have no doubt he will ethically and competently serve Lebanon in his capacity as the chief law enforcer in Lebanon. [Full disclosure: I know the Minister personally, and happen to like him].

Baroud's appointment is also a statement of President Sleiman's commitment to Lebanon. Baroud is one of President Sleiman's 3 cabinet appointees. I know nothing of their personal or familial relationship, but the fact that Baroud is serving in this cabinet is encouraging.

2. Elias Murr, Minister of Defense. Minister Murr is a political appointee, but serves as if he is a technocrat. He was an excellent Interior Minister, and even better as Minister of Defense. He knows the political obligations of his position, but ensures that his ministry is constantly improving and working to meet international standards.

Politically, he and his father, Metn MP and za'im Michel el-Murr, balance between the competing influences in Lebanon. He supported former President Emile Lahoud, then support the 14 March Coalition when the situation required it of him, and is now representing President Michel Sleiman.

This could be interpreted as political opportunism or the machinations of a political family trying to constantly maintain their grip on power, however, the excellent job Murr has done in his position suggests a realistic and competent defense of Lebanon and Lebanese sovereignty.

President Sleiman appointed Murr, as well.

3. Raymond Audi, Minister of the Displaced. I know little about Raymond Audi's political background. I have an account with his bank, and I have met him on a few apolitical occasions. The Minister collects and appreciates art, which is a shared interest.

Regardless, a banker and financier assuming a ministry allegedly reputed as one of the best for graft and embezzlement, could be a positive development.

However, it is not necessarily a positive development that one of the wealthiest and most prominent Lebanese citizens is filling a position that could go to a less prominent and wealthy expert in the field.

4. Muhammed Khalifeh, Minister of Health. Khalifeh was an excellent Health Minister in the previous government. Unfortunately, his Amal political affiliation forced him to resign from his position before the end of his term, but he still upheld the highest of standards.

A few months ago, Hezbollah spread rumors that the Future Movement would support Khalifeh as Minister of Health in the next government, given his capabilities. This was not just a swipe at Amal (rumored to actively endorse embezzlement), but a vote of confidence in a capable minister.

5. Tarek Mitri, Minister of Information. I am not sure what the Minister of Information does. I know that journalists receive their press credentials from the Ministry. PSP MP Ghazi Aridi has occupied the position for so long, I generally associate it as the ministry for eloquent government spokespeople.

Regardless, Mitri is a technocrat par excellence. He joined the previous government as one of President Lahoud's appointees, but continued to serve in a prominent capacity in the 14 March government as the "opposition" resigned.

Mitri was the best post-war Minister of Culture, and (no insult to Minister Aridi - who has received a portfolio boost) will probably be the best post-war Minister of Information. He's competent, qualified, dignified, and highly competent.

The bad:

1. Elie Skaff, Minister of Agriculture. Do I need to explain? It has been publicly alleged that Skaff profited massively from his previous Ministerial posts.

Skaff dominates Zahle and West Bekaa politics. The man is quite genial. He has an excellent sense of humor, and his politics are not sectarian. Future Movement Sunnis in the West Bekaa love Skaff just as much Greek Catholics in Zahle.

However, naming him to this portfolio is a blatantly political attempt to provide aid to Bekaa farmers in an effort to win over votes in the next parliamentary elections for himself, Michel Aoun, and pro-Syrian allies (perhaps, Abdel Rahim Mrad), against supporters of the Future Movement and other 14 March parties.

2. Gebran Bassil, Minister of Telecommunications. Telecommunications? Seriously? Why, because he dominates the Lebanese airwaves so much?

Bassil is regularled criticized for being ill-prepared for television interviews. His political rise is entirely tied to his marriage to Michel Aoun's daughter. FPM members claim he is brilliant, and singlehandedly crafted their "Memorandum of Understanding" with Hezbollah. 14 March supporters claim the man is the incompetent scion of the Aounist establishment.

Such an important Ministry? Really?

At this time, Lebanon needs a truly competent person in this position. Why not the allegedly competent Issam Abu Jamra? (Oh, yeah. That's because Aoun wanted to steal the ceremonial "deputy prime minister" from Elias el-Murr).

Former Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamade was reputed to leave the majority of day to day business to his operations officer, who is also the head of Ogero. However, Hamade's political view - primarily his interest in safeguarding his personal safety (he was a target of assassination in 2004) and that of his associates - provided impetus to guarantee that the Interior Ministry and UN investigating team had access to the necessary telephone files.

I know the former Minister personally, and he is a highly intelligent man. His political view, however, might have also stifled the privatization of Lebanon's telecommunications networks, as his Future Movement chief operations officer is rumored to be making present decisions based on an interest in becoming the future CEO of a privatized Ogero. The head of Ogero is competent, but I hear there needs to be a bit more oversight in the ministry. Will Bassil provide it?

Hamade's son also owns a telecommunications firm, which was a blatant conflict of interest for the former minister, which is sadly expect in Lebanon (please don't cancel my internet account).

If Bassil takes aggressive action, I will support him the entire way. If, while in this position, he behaves like the Aounist political partisan he has for the last three years, I will be utterly disgusted, especially at this crucial time.

Thankfully, the heads of Ogero, MTC, and Alfa are highly intelligent and competent individuals. Given their competence, if Bassil decides to use his post for political purposes alone, Lebanon will be fine. If he chooses to stifle March 14 investigations into assassinations, his post will be devastating for Lebanon.

3. Talal Arslan, Minister of Youth and Sports. Seriously? Arslan? Come on, opposition. Do you really hate Waleed Jumblatt that much? I guess so. Thanks for letting him know where you stand. If you nominated Wiam Wahhab during the cabinet negotiations for the position, you would have even more blatantly let all of us know your fealty to the Syrian regime. Oh, wait. You did that by annointing Ali Qanso as a Minister of State.


The expected:

1. Bahia Hariri, Minister of Education. I understand the political calculations for naming Hariri to this position, but is there any way she could be construed as a technocrat? Sadly, I don't think so.

Hariri has suffered significantly with the assassination of her brother, the daily attacks on her family's reputation, and the threats to her personal safety. Regardless, I can think of no other reason to appoint her to this ministry other than in preparation for the next elections. Hezbollah, the Saad family, and other powerful families in Saida have the strength to sweep Bahia Hariri out of her seat in the qada during the next elections, if 14 March is not aggressive.

But seriously, education? I guess the Hariri's used to give a lot of education grants, but they significantly decreased those efforts in 1998.

Hariri deserves a cabinet seat. My disappointment is that there are so many qualified educators in Lebanon who truly deserve this position who would make it their personal priority to better the quality of education in Lebanon. If Lebanon produces anything, it is educated and brilliant minds, many of whom serve as teachers and professors in Lebanon, and also the majority of others who pursue careers abroad.

2. Muhammad Chattah, Minister of Finance. Chattah is a smart man. He is dignified and loyal.

He also happens to be from Tripoli, which will be the sight of a major electoral battle during the next elections, especially if Muhammad Safadi, Najib Miqati, and Omar Karami unite and throw money at the locals.

Chattah has the required experience for this crucial position. He is also one of the most trusted Hariri/Siniora aides. Yet, Jihad Azour was excellent as Minister of Finance. He won international awards, was loved by his staff, and has international credibility.

I understand that the Future Movement was limited in the number of Christian ministers it could appoint. I understand that Hezbollah/Amal tried to name all of the Shia ministers, so Future tried to name all of the Sunni ministers. I understand that Chattah is competent and credible and will probably do an excellent job. But shouldn't Future fight to be able to appoint competent Christian ministers, or at least urge Future's Christian political allies to lend a spot to a technocrat? Shouldn't the Future Movement award competence?

I am happy that a competent person is in the position of Finance Minister. I am also happy that Chattah was named as a member of the cabinet. He would serve well in any cabinet position.

However, I do not like that his appointment can be construed as being made for blatantly political and sectarian reasons, and that a highly competent, technocratic, successful, admirable person was removed from the cabinet.

3. Khaled Qabbani, Minister of State. Seriously, Future Movement, what does Qabbani do for you? I'm being entirely serious.

In the previous government, he was education minister. Did he serve with particular distinction?

In the previous government, he made a ridiculous fuss about the Habtoor Grand Hotel being a story too tall. It was a non-decorous move.

Is he that important for the next elections? Siniora, is he that good of an adviser? Or, do you just like his tinted glasses, and the fact that he follows you around everywhere and looks like a pious Muslim when you pray in front of television cameras?

4. Tamam Salam, Minister of Culture. Come oooooooon, Future Movement. This move is so blatantly political, it is ridiculous.

Salam is a good guy. He's from a prominent Sunni Beiruti family. Getting him on your side helps you prevent Salim al-Hoss and other pro-Syrian Sunnis in Beirut from winning a seat or two in the newly apportioned Beirut parliamentary districts.

However, after an excellent technocratic Minister of Culture like Tarek Mitri, Salam seems like an entirely political appointee. I'm not saying that he will not do a phenomenal job. He might. But your reasons for choosing him, Mitri's excellent tenure, and the huge possibility that he will use the trappings of his office without returning the favor to the Lebanese people who democratically elected the parliament that appoints him is reason enough for me to be disappointed. Please, please, please, surprise me with your competence, sense of duty, and interest in defending Lebanon's cultural freedom, Minister Salam. I apologize for my skepticism in advance.

5. Everybody else. Pretty much all of the other ministers are expected and their appointments made for political reasons, so I won't comment on them. The above ministers are the ones that most inspired/ disappointed me.


Obviously, many ministers received their positions based on pragmatic politics, not competence. However, this cabinet is much better than it would have been if political views were the only justification for appointments. There is plenty of competence.

Obviously, I am also much more disappointed with the Future Movement than with other parties. This, obviously, shows my bias and the fact that I expect more from PM Siniora than I do from, say, Elie Skaff and Ali Qanso.

I have come to expect a certain type of behavior and a certain display of moral and ethical values from Amal and Hezbollah, which makes me surprised when a compentent and qualified person like Muhammad Khalifeh is appointed as a minister.

The PSP cabinet selections are expected. I am surprised that Marwan Hamade is not a minister in the current government. However, losing a seat to Talal Arslan was probably a difficult compromise to make, as well.

I do not know why Waleed Jumblatt continues to appoint Wael Abou Faour to positions. This is not to say anything about about Minister of State (ie, without portfolio) Abou Faour. I have never met him. However, he is obviously providing value to his party and people. I say this merely because I do not know much about Abou Faour, which is entirely my fault.

The ministers representing the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb, and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering are untested commodities. Much would be expected of Qornet Shehwan cabinet member Nassib Lahoud. However, he does not have a portfolio. This means that he will probably dominate Lebanese microphones between now and the next parliamentary elections. His cabinet seat might also put him in a better negotiating position with Amine Gemayel, Michel el-Murr, Karim Pakradouni, and Hagop Pakradounian in getting elected as a parliamentarian from Metn.

Best Araq?

Tripoli is under attack, and no one knows what will happen in Lebanon come the end of summer. However, summer is tourist/ araq season.

Grapes ripen in the autumn, however, summer always reminds me of copious cups of araq.

Sure, sure, araq baladi is the best. I am sure your uncle makes the best brew on top of some mountain somewhere, and only the best cousins can get their hands on the stuff. I have a big jug of the stuff sitting in my pantry.

There needs to be a corporate Lebanese araq ranking. Michael Karam wrote a book about araq, but there needs to be a practical list.

Lebanese abroad love bringing the sexy blue Massaya araq bottles and the Rif "traditional Lebanese" logo araq bottles back to Liberia, Australia, and Canada. Yet, which are the best? Does the best araq come in the best branded bottles? Can one purchase an amazing bottle of branded araq?

1. Kefraya - Kefraya's araq is creamy and smooth. Unlike other brands of araq, Kefraya's is not watery. The beverage is consistent and cool. The taste of Kefraya araq, unlike araq baladi, is consistent from year to year. The araq flavor is excellent, but it is the texture that puts Kefraya over the top and into hte number one position.

2. Le Brun - Le Brun is the Lebanese standard. Brun began producing araq in Zahle in the 19th Century, and the current owners, the Issa family, continue the tradition. Like Kefraya, Brun araq is consistent and delicious. Brun is the perfect araq to accompany a meal. Brun araq accompanies dishes well, but will hardly provide a unique araq experience.

3. Touma - This inexpensive araq brand is the best quality for the cost. The bottles are ridiculously cheap. The content is watery and provides a bit of an aftertaste, but does the job, as long as one is looking for the right amount of alcohol to kill the bacteria in kibbeh nayyeh during a Sunday afternoon lunch.

There are plenty of other araq brands:

Pricier:
Ksarak
Massaya - the blue bottle
Rif - the traditional Lebanese/ baladi logo

Mid-range:
El Beit al Araq
As Samir
Fakra
Kouroum
Wardy
Chateau Khoury (I haven't tried it, but if it is as good as the wine, then it should be in the top three)

Inexpensive:
Gantous
Litani
Hasbani


What are your favorites?

Deals? Lebanon, America, and the Middle East

Lebanese have been talking about a deal between America, Iran, and Syria for years. From 2005-2007, this deal seemed unlikely.

2008, however, is the year in which quite a few Lebanese analysts believe some deal has "actually" occurred.

One professor at the American University of Beirut argues, "Look at the violence in Iraq. It has decreased tremendously. This could not happen without Syria and Iran taking action.

"Look at Israel's negotiations with Syria under Turkish eyes. America definitely knows about this, not just on the intel level, but on the diplomatic level. Something is happening."

Is there a deal? I have no idea. For a long time, I did not think it would even be possible. Now, however, there are military movements. What does it mean? Still, no idea, and yet what local politically connected analysts are saying is that the Tribunal matters less and less.

For quite a long time, many Sunni in Beirut were interested in toppling the Syrian regime. That language is gone. They seem to believe the regime in Damascus is here to stay, not because of an American deal, but because of a confluence of interests, much of which emanates from the Arabian Gulf.

Is it possible that the US is urging the Gulf States to take an easier line on Syria? Yes. Is it possible that the Turks and Israelis are involved in influencing the American position? Yes. Is this true? I have no idea.

My read:

1. After the Hezbollah campaign in Beirut in May 2008, it seems that the Europeans are willing to placate the Iranians and Hezbollah. The EU was never aggressive in the first place, and now seem far more willing to normalize relations.

2. It is regularly mentioned that the Israeli government is weak, and Prime Minister Olmert is looking for minor gains. He has Ehud Barak's example to follow. Olmert might be perceived as a failure now, but if he can craft some sort of deal, his political life could last long after this term as Prime Minister.

3. The Saudi government realizes that its efforts at international diplomacy have only brought disgrace to the King in situations where he has put his credibility on the line, ie the Mecca Agreement and support for Hariri and the Siniora government. Iran/Syria have checked him at each advance.

4. President Bush's term is coming to an end, and it is more important to justify and guarantee a free and stable Iraq than it is to crush other American enemies.

5. From what I hear from Europeans, there is an international belief that the Middle East conflict can be contained at the moment, given the price of oil. The US, Europe, India, and China have an interest in preventing a Mideast cataclysm, and Iran and Russia perhaps believe that their currently profitable interests would be hurt if there is any more instability.

I have no idea, but what I hear indicates that the US, and especially Europe, are taking a much less aggressive stance when it comes to Mideast politics. And "deal" rumors are spoken about in Beirut as if it verified fact...

Physician Elections

I have seen no press coverage regarding the League of Physicians elections. Then again, I haven't really been looking.

Over the past two weeks, I've received myriad text messages:

"Dear Dr., for the election on July 6, don't forget your LOP card or ID, Tazkara, Ikhraj Kaid less than 1 year, or passport. These are the only ID paper [sic] accepted." - 30 June 2008

"Dear Dr., the Lebanese Order of Physicians is pleased to grant you for the coming 2 weeks a free Dr.s platinum Mastercard with free benefits." - 1 July 2008

"Dear Doctor, You are the voice of wisdom, of pride. You are Lebanon best [sic]. Lebanon will appreciate to hear your voice Sunday for our brothers the doctors candidates of 14th of March. Confirm your choice for the best Sunday 7th until 13:00. Make the difference. God bless you. The friends of 14th of March." - Signed Doctors14th 3 July 2008

I accidentally deleted the first half of this message, but here is the second half:
"Make the difference. Please vote, Lebanon needs you. We need you [sic] vote for the candidates of 14th of March. God bless you. The friends of 14th of March." - 6 July 2008

"Get a USD 5,000 loan from BLC Bank and repay only USD 135 a month." - 7 July 2008

On the day of the election, I received a personal call from one of the candidates.

He was surprised and angered to hear that I had no intention of voting. I do not believe that syndicates and professional associations should be governed by the usual Lebanese political refrains. This might anger many of you readers. One (more specifically, you) may argue that Lebanese politics is such that these minor elections make politically significant something that should remain parochial; therefore, by your logic, I should manifest my political beliefs in a professional situation.

Unfortunately, I do not believe in politicizing healthcare. Labor unions throughout the world are political, but in Lebanon their politics have little to do with bettering the conditions of their constituents (doctors, construction workers, hotel and services workers, plumbers, etc.), and more to do with making a political statement for a particular political faction.

Don't forget, Hezbollah invaded Beirut under the pretext of a labor strike to raise the minimum wage.

Still No Peace in Lebanon

Apologies for not blogging over the past few weeks. After the conflict, I needed a break.

As predicted, the Doha Agreement merely ended the chaos in Beirut, elected President Michel Sleiman, and provided tourists and Lebanese abroad with the semblance of stability.

Violence continues to break out across Lebanon. Tripoli is the most recent site of full-scale sectarian, political violence.

Violence rages in Palestinians camps. As usual, the Lebanese media inflates rumors and scares the Lebanese population into believing the next Nahr al Bared is upon us.

Sectarianism is the highest I have ever seen it. Many older residents of Beirut believe the discord between Lebanese sects is the greatest they have ever seen in their lifetimes. Of course, the Lebanese media continues to fan sectarian flames.

For a time after Doha, it seemed that Hezbollah and Amal would make sure that a new Lebanese government would come together quickly. However, they have since decided that the most politically expedient action for them is to allow MP Michel Aoun to block any government formation. This accomplishes two things:

1) Prime Minister-designate Fouad Siniora and the March 14 Coalition is undermined and once again their political power is in the balance.

2) President Michel Sleiman is being undermined and shown that he better not make any decisions the opposition dislikes. Right now, the opposition is testing to see if Sleiman will bend/break when pressured. Fortunately for Sleiman, he has powerful allies in March 14. Unfortunate for Sleiman, his main ally and the chief architect of his election, Michel el-Murr, is being targeted by Hezbollah, Amal, and Michel Aoun for his March 14 biases, and for his political break with Aoun's political bloc.

Once again, the opposition shifts the debate time and again away from compromise. When March 14 leaders concede a point to the opposition, they instantly demand something else. Take for instance this effort to try and tie the formation of the new government to negotiations over the electoral law, negotiations which will be trying and drawn out.

The Icing on the Cake

Hezbollah now contends that it has no interest in ever giving up its weapons, regardless of a return of all Lebanese prisoners in Israel and Israel conceding to the Syrian invented claim that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese.

Even worse, Hezbollah is preventing full, peaceful negotiations with Israel over myriad issues, even though both Hezbollah and Syria are negotiating with the Israelis right now.

Negotiations with Israel over the southern border are extremely important. Areas like the Shebaa Farms and the village of al-Ghajar are neither completely Lebanese or Syrian territory. As the late Syrian President Hafez al Assad noted, the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Golan was never defined. Al-Ghajar, literally, lies on both sides of the border. Technically, part of the village is Lebanese, but the residents are primarily Allawi and publicly announce that they consider themselves Syrian.

Syria is currently negotiating over the Golan, which is most likely why they refuse to sign any legal documents to support their claim that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese. This is also why Syria's Lebanese allies refuse to allow direct negotiations between Lebanon and Syria. Syria wants to be in charge of all negotiations, and a settlement between Lebanon and Israel removes more than one of Syria's negotiating cards.

Just as Syria refuses to demarcate the eastern border between Lebanon and Syria, if the Golan is returned to them, they will most likely use that territory to their advantage.

Syria wants to make sure that there will be no peace between Lebanon and Israel before Syria is able to extract everything they want out of the Israelis, and probably also extract everything they want out of the international community (which definitely includes diminishing Lebanese sovereignty in favor of Syrian hegemony).

UEFA Cup and Beirut Politics

The Italians wore blue. The Dutch wore Orange. The referees wore yellow.

But what some viewers of the UEFA Cup in Beirut saw on Monday 9 June was Lebanese politics.

"Ahhh, the Aounniye are beating Mustaqbal," said one observer noting that the Dutch team, wearing the colors of Lebanese Christian opposition figure Michel Aoun, scored two goals in the first half while the Italians scored none, despite wearing blue uniforms, the color of Saad al Hariri's Future (Mustaqbal) Movement.

Another woman responded, "What do you expect when Hezbollah sets the rules." Hezbollah's color is yellow, and the party has a "Memorandum of Understanding" with Michel Aoun.

The current fury over football reminds locals that sport is as much of a Lebanese passion as politics. Beirut's downtown came alive in 2004 when the Greeks won the European football competition. In June 2006 Beirut's streets turned to utter chaos with World Cup fever.

One longtime Beirut residing Dutch observer walking through Beirut's downtown noted, "It's as if everything that happened between the end of the World Cup 2006 and the UEFA Cup 2008 did not take place. It's as if nothing happened."

For all the revelry surrounding President Sleiman's election and the first conflict free summer, there are still violent acts occuring throughout Lebanon. Sunday night, a battle was fought between Hezbollah supporters and Future supporters in the Bekaa. A skirmish also took place in the Chouf mountains between rival Druze factions.

The security situation has not improved. The Palestinian camps are entirely unregulated, and strange stories routinely crop up about unknown individuals living in the camps becoming involved in violent activities.

Aoun Blocking Cabinet Formation: His Last Stand?

According to members of the Amal Movement, Michel Aoun is needlessly blocking the creation of a new Lebanese cabinet. Amal officially denied these claims today, but party activists claim what they told me yesterday is true.

Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun intentionally requested particular ministries in Prime Minister Siniora's government to block the formation of the cabinet. Aoun has long been interested in the Justice Ministry, so it was immediately suspicious to Siniora's staff and Future Movement members that Aoun requested the ministries of Finance, Public Works, Health, Labor, and one other (possibly agriculture?).

These ministries are the few that have publicly been spoken for. Current Finance Minister Jihad Azour strongly requested that he continue in the job. He's done a phenomenal job, and Siniora and Amal thought that there is no reason he should not continue. Tripoli MP Muhammad Safadi has made it known that he is interested in the Public Works ministry, which he presided over in the previous government. The most skilled and reputable Amal minister in the previous government Khalifeh, presided over the Ministry of Health and Amal publicly made it know that the party wants him to continue the excellent job he did previously. The Ministry of Labor always goes to an extreme pro-Syrian figure.

According to Future and Amal members, Aoun is disingenuously engaging in the formation of the cabinet. He had no interest in electing Michel Sleiman president. He did not want Siniora to return as prime minister, and he knows that his political party and support will forever be transformed if the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) takes part in the government.

According to Amal sources, Aoun is doing this because he is taking orders from Syria, which is furious that it no longer has a stranglehold on Lebanon. My take is different:

First, Aoun is the sole leader of the FPM. According to the press, the FPM is divided between followers of Aoun and idealistic Christian technocrats who do not like the direction sectarian, feudal Lebanon is headed. Recently, party divisions came to light during the FPM internal elections, which were postponed.

Second, the FPM is not alloted 5 ministries in the next government. Hezbollah originally insinuated that it would give Aoun its share of seats in the next government, but then reversed their decision.

Had Aoun been elected president, he would have had tremendous power. He could have solidified his domination over the FPM and begun digging further into the support bases of other Christian leaders. He would have been able to appoint all of the members of his family and inner circle to well-paying positions (ministries, advisers, generals, ambassadors), but also have plenty of room to provide positions to supporters from the other side of the party.

Now, Aoun's choices are limited. He was not allocated enough ministries to do what he wants to do, which is:

a) appoint his relatives, like Gebran Bassil, as ministers;

b) appoint two opposing FPM leaders from the non-inner circle camp to ministries and bait them to feud with one another, thus maintaining Aoun's position as undeniable party leader, moderator of internal party conflicts, and also preventing any other FPM leader from using his ministry/power base to begin rising in the party and becoming a leader in his own right;

c) appoint non-Christian ministers to advance Aoun's secular, non-sectarian credentials;

d) minimize the influence of Hariri, Siniora, Jumblatt, Geagea, and Gemayel and steal press time away from, while also coming closer to dictating the terms of the new cabinet;

e) to further expand Aoun's and the FPM's base throughout all of Lebanon, including all sects and regions. If Aoun could do this, he would simultaneous become i) the only truly national Lebanese leader, thus the most powerful politician in Lebanon, ii) the undeniable Christian leader, including in Koura and Zahle which are still ruled by allies, iii) the unopposed leader of the FPM, iv) in a position to challenge the constitutionality of Sleiman's election and call for a new election, v) fully advance his own agenda, and become the savior of Lebanon.

It's a nice dream. However, there is no room to compromise in Aoun's vision. He wants power to implement his dream. FPMers defend Aoun because they believe in his dream. March 14ers cannot get beyond Aoun's tactics, and for obvious reasons like intentionally blocking the formation of a new cabinet, undermining negotiations, destroying opportunities for compromise and unity, and not requesting what he really wants, all while claiming moral superiority.

In the cabinet negotiations, Aoun probably doesn't have much of a plan. His advisers are probably competing amongst themselves.

Aoun cannot honestly negotiate, because specific ministries are not what he wants. He wants it all, and asking for ministries others have already spoken for is only a stalling device. He doesn't really want the ministries of Finance, Justice, or Foreign Affairs. What use to him are ministries like Labor, Agriculture, Environment, and Youth & Sports, if every March 14 journalist in Lebanon is waiting to catch the FPM in instances of government graft. His cabinet seats won't even be enough to delay a vote, let alone block anything. He will become just like everyone else.

The Amal people claim Aoun is targeting Future for obvious reasons, but also targeting them because Aoun is angry about the Doha negotiations in which Amal leader and Parliamentary Speaker Nabih al-Berri forced Aoun's hand, and allegedly disrespected the FPM leader. Berri emerged as the leader of Lebanon after the Doha round to a greater extent even than Hezbollah.

Aoun has been parochialized. He no longer has the support powerful Metn MP Michel el-Murr, and is watching President Sleiman steal away Aoun's multi-sectarian support in the military, in Jbeil, and in the Christian community at large. During the next parliamentary elections under the new electoral law, Aoun will undoubtedly lose seats to the local leaders he empowered in 2005, like Murr, Skaff, and Franjieh, lose blocs who supported him in 2005 like Nemattallah Abi Nasr's bloc in Kesrouwan, lose the entire kada of Jbeil to President Sleiman, and watch former loyalists peel off and join with more powerful camps.

Not only this, but Aoun is too old and too senile to envision many more years of dominant power and clout. The FPM cabinet ministers will form their own bases of support separate from Aoun. The TV cameras will flock to them before making the trek to Rabieh. Aoun's own OTV is failing so miserably that it might not be on the air for long if it continues in the same way, and if it changes, Aoun probably won't have nearly as much influence over it.

Aoun thinks of himself too highly to take a minor position like that of a minister. He was commander of the Army, for crying out loud! He has more support than Amine Gemayel or Michel Murr. Gebran Bassil should be his Pierre Gemayel or Elias Murr, while he gives commands from above and accepts visits from ambassadors and foreign dignitaries.

This is a last minute effort to appear powerful and influential, but no one is playing Aoun's games any more. Amal and Hezbollah used Aoun when they needed a Christian spokesman and Christian cover to do Syria's bidding. Now, they no longer need him and are just as irritated at his antics as March 14 figures have been for years.

Aoun has a dream, but he has no idea about how to get there. In the meantime, he is creating nightmares for his countrymen, but he might not even be able to do this for long.

A Modest Proposal: Bringing Question Time to Lebanon

Nearly all parties in Lebanon claim that their opponents are irresponsible, unjust, and stifle the ability of hardworking politicians to make Lebanon a better place. This happens in every democratic political system. However, unlike in other countries, Lebanese citizens only hear rhetoric without the accompanying evidence.

A great way to prove to the Lebanese people that the Lebanese government is working on their behalf would be to institute the parliamentary mechanism of Question Time.

In Lebanon, unlike in Britain, the government is made up of disparate political factions who use the media, not the parliament, to air grievances. Sadly, this has little effect on governing, but incites violence, sectarian anger, and trepidation in the Lebanese population. The politicians continue to operate as normal, while the Lebanese population changes their personal behaviors, friendships, and economic choices.

To make the Lebanese government more transparent and appear as if it is working on behalf of the electorate, parliamentarians should air their grievances to the prime minister and his cabinet publicly.

Finance Minister Jihad Azour does a phenomenal job. His ministry is the most transparent and is persuading other ministries to follow the same path. Yet, most Lebanese citizens believe that the Finance Ministry is troubled, steals money, and fails to work in the interests of Lebanese citizens. Opponents of Azour nominate buffoons to serve in the post Azour commands brilliantly. Question time will give the public the opportunity to hear Azour’s opponents attack him, and allow Azour to explain that he is doing an excellent job.

Ministers improperly executing their jobs will most likely be motivated to take a more active role in daily ministerial operations. Individuals unqualified to lead a cabinet post might be dissuaded from hubristically demanding a highly complex and important portfolio.

Hopefully, technocrats of all sects and stripes would be the beneficiaries of this mechanism.

Jihad, Jihadi, Jihadist...

The New York Times has an interesting article by Peter W. Singer and Elina Noor entitled, "What Do You Call a Terror(Jihad)ist?"

They discuss the value of using the term jihadist, and finally decide that terrorist is a better description.

They argue:

IMAGINE if Franklin D. Roosevelt had taken to calling Adolf Hitler the “leader of the National Socialist Aryan patriots” or dubbed Japanese soldiers fighting in World War II as the “defenders of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

...

First, to call a terrorist a “jihadist” or “jihadi” effectively puts any campaign against terrorism into the framework of an existential battle between the West and Islam. This feeds into the worldview propagated by Al Qaeda. It also serves to isolate the tens of millions of Muslims who condemn the violence that has been perpetrated in the name of Islam.

Second, these words locate the ideological battle exactly where the extremists want it to be. The terms of discussion are no longer about the murder of innocents in terrorist acts; they are about theology.

Third, when American leaders use this language it sends a confusing message to the Muslim world, showing ignorance on basic issues and possibly even raising doubts about American motives. Why, after all, would we call our enemy a “holy warrior”?

If we want to say what we mean, what terms better describe Qaeda members and other violent extremists? “Muharib” or the more colloquial “hirabi” or “hirabist” would be good places to start. “Hirabah,” the base word, is a term for barbarism or piracy. Unlike “jihad,” which grants honor, “hirabah” brings condemnation; it involves unlawful violence and disorder.

Of course, it’s probably best not to engage in these nuances at all. Which is why American leaders would do best to call terrorists by their rightful name: “terrorists.” The label may seem passé, but terrorism is an internationally recognized word for an internationally recognized crime. If we want to win a war of words, we would do well to choose the ones we use with greater care.

Spring Beirut Marathon

The derek zoomed through the streets booming, "Remove your vehicles. Remove your vehicles." The marathon is tomorrow.

How many people will participate? Just Lebanese, most likely - this is not an official international competition.

Will Beiruti get anything in return for the inconvenience of moving theirs cars? Maybe a few extra tourist dollars for the neighborhood dekane...

Regardless, pictures of President Sleiman are everywhere. The Qawmy and Future members in my neighborhood might want to kill each other, but "we are all united for Sleiman," and the symbolism matters.

Fairouz is playing from most shops. However, politics is expressed in the particular song being played. We won't go into the specifics, "Oh, flower from the south, oh, crying bird." For all of you abroad we are playing,"Kifak inta?"

A New Siniora Government

President Michel Sleiman re-appointed Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

Working too much today, but here's a quick, off-the-cuff reaction about why this is good:

1) it keeps in power a man reknowned for his ability to reconcile fighting factions;

2) it goes a good ways to guarantee that the opposition won't whittle away at the reforms of the previous government;

3) it unites 14 March leaders, and gives the 14 March Coalition bona fides as a unified movement, not just an organization bought and paid for by the Hariri's and Saudi Arabia. Calls for Muhammad Safadi to be elected as premier are being made by the opposition, but are not legitimate. I'm sure that there are plenty of other people who want to be named prime minister, but after the recent conflicts and given that the Future Movement is the majority group in parliament, an experienced prime minister with national support is the best option. The choice is for 14 March to make about the prime minister. It is an internal decision (for more on this, see below);

4) Lebanon needs an experienced prime minister will guarantee to Lebanon's foreign allies, like the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah did not mount a coup, despite the changes that occurred.

4) The leader of the government should not be the leader of the Sunni community, for then any removal of him would appear as a slight to the Sunnis as a whole, not removal based on incompetence or for the sake of compromise. The whole of Lebanon is burdened under the weight of Nabih al Berri because the majority of Shia legislators claim that any slight against him is a slight against all Shia, which is ridiculous, but beneficial to both Berri and Hezbollah;

5) If Amal and Hezbollah complain about Siniora being prime minister, then Berri's seat is on the line. The president was a consensus choice, but the prime minister's office is not on the table.
The Sunni and Shia have united around specific factions, and they will not retreat. This is especially true given the way Speaker Berri has failed to do his job and proven to be entirely aligned with Syria and the opposition. The prime minister might not be the leader of the Sunnis, but given the way the Shia have set the table, the PM should at least be appointed by the Sunnis.

6) For the Future Movement:
a. any of Siniora's failings will be blamed on him, not Saad, who is inexperienced and might fail when faced with Lebanon's experienced political class;
b. Siniora can compromise on issues that the Saudis might not want Saad Hariri to compromise on;
c. appointing Siniora shows strength in the face of weakness (remember what happened to Future TV and Beirut).

This is a Sunni-Shia issue. Michel Aoun, Sleiman Franjieh, and Assad Hardane are taking the lead in attacking Siniora. Hezballah/Amal feel the same way as the rest of the opposition, but have to keep their mouths shut or risk putting Berri's job on the line (and there are many qualified Shia within the opposition waiting for this to happen).

Christian Lebanon lost its influence long ago, and a weak president like Sleiman guarantees that the Sunni and Shia will dictate to the president. The choice of Sleiman makes it impossible for the president to have enough power of office or character to moderate between the two sides. He will have to find some independent power base equal to the immense amount of domestic power of Future/Hezbollah/Amal, or take one side.

The Syrians refused a powerful president in Lebanon, because they know that this would open a space for a Christian president to fill the broker position Syria occupied during its reign.

Given that the 1960 electoral law is empowering Franjieh and other Christian zuama, the Christians will lose relevance almost completely and be junior partners in any future parliament or government. Some Christians will side with 14 March and others with 8 March. This will most likely guarantee that the Christians keep the number of seats in parliament allocated to them, and the apportionment in government hiring. Christians represent more than a third of the population, based on multiple estimates, but occupy 50% of parliamentary seats. The Sunni and Shia won't risk uniting all Christians together by bringing up these questions, and the Lebanese agenda will continue to be dictated by the Sunni Mustaqbal and the Shia HA/Amal for the time being.

Beirut Celebrations, Nasrallah Speech

Lebanese citizens packed Beirut's downtown. It's the most packed I've ever seen it; even more than during the 2005 and 2006 protests, although the area was smaller this time, and the people were more densely packed.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nassrallah spoke earlier in the evening. His speech was truculent and non-conciliatory. It was liberation of the south day, thus a day for tough speeches, but at this crucial moment in Lebanese history, Lebanese people need guidance from their leaders. Men and women of influence need to encourage their followers not to take violent action.

Unfortunately, no Lebanese leader has risen to call for true national reconciliation. The celebrations in the downtown were marred by clashes. Youths fought each other over silly political identities. As these hooligans chanted their silly Hariri, Amal, Hezbollah slogans, no members of their political coalitions stepped in to say, "Bala taefiyyeh, bala siyasiyeh. This is a time for unity and celebration." These youths bullied the crowd, and no one stopped them. When they fought, the Army had to step in.

Sadly, stray bullets after Nasrallah's speech severely injured many Lebanese who currently lie in critical condition in hospital. Clashes broke out between Sunni and Shia in Corniche al Mazraa.

This summer will be profitable, but the peace is superficial.

Regardless, the economic effects of the reconciliation is already being felt. Workers are asking for increased salaries. The downtown is packed with restaurants, which are hiring workers to clean the establishments, and hiring many workers and waiters. Four friends who are waiters tell me that they can make $2,000 a month as waiters in downtown Beirut. They can make $450 an hour at certain pubs and nightclubs on Friday and Saturday nights. They could make even more at places like Sky Bar and Crystal, especially if the Gulf tourists return to Beirut.

Also, downtown appears as a Lebanese (not a Gulf tourist) place. I've never seen so many working class and middle class Lebanese in Beirut's downtown before. In the past, the criticism of the downtown was that the vast majority of Lebanese could not even afford a coffee in the over-priced area. That is no longer true. Aramoun Mini Market between the clock tower and the Greek Catholic Church (currently being rehabilitated) sells reasonably priced merchandise to those who don't want to pay $5 for a Diet Pepsi in one of the downtown's "see and be seen" cafes. It was the most crowded and popular place.

Sleiman's Election

General Michel Sleiman was just elected president.

Parliamentary Speaker Nabih al Berri stole the limelight, and is behaving as if he is running the show. He is accompanying President Michel Sleiman everywhere, as if he is a child whom Berri must escort around. It's as if he is a North Korean minder. Given that Berri is the Syrian regime's most powerful Lebanese ally, images of assassinated President Rene Muawad keep coming to mind when I think of President Sleiman trying to veer away from Berri.

Berri refused to elect Sleiman in accordance with the Lebanese Constitution, despite protests from 3 Christian legislators, and also Shia legislator Hussein Husseini. Berri singlehandedly makes decisions on the Constitution, it seems. He decided that the Siniora government was unconstitutional, and now he has decided that a senior Lebanese civil servant can be directly elected president, despite the Constitution noting that such a person must be out of office for at least two years prior to being elected president. Even the Syrians followed the Lebanese Constitution when electing and extending the term of former President Emile Lahoud.

Despite the Lebanese Army asking citizens not to fire their weapons in the air in celebration of Sleiman's election, automatic weapons fire can be heard all over Beirut. A journalist friend in the downtown had to hide under a bridge to avoid getting hit by bullets returning to the ground. A bullet landed approximately 2 meters away from him.

The streets of Ras Beirut are empty. However, there is plenty of noise. Televisions tuned to the parliamentary session blare from apartment windows. When Sleiman was elected, clapping could be heard all over.

The Emir of Qatar seems to have assumed the role of protector of Lebanon. The Syrians did a horrible job in that position. In 2005, Lebanese politicians petitioned the United States and Iran to take over Syria's overlordship. Both countries realized that taking such responsibility was not to their benefit. Qatar stepped in, not just to broker between Lebanese politicians, but to bargain with their regional political sponsors: Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League. It's seems that Qatar's strategy and balancing act - cooperating with Israel and Hezbollah, the United States and Iran - is paying off. They now have a greater regional prominence, but it is yet to be seen if Qatar will gain anything but grief in return.

Opposition Continues Its Shenanigans

Amal leader and parliamentary speaker Nabih al Berri continues to claim that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government is unconstitutional. To this end, he refuses to allow Siniora into the parliament (Siniora is not an elected member of parliament) to participate in General Michel Sleiman's election.

This entirely undermines the Doha Agreement, which happened partially because the March 14 Coalition believed the opposition would not immediately attack the initiatives of the previous government during this period of national-unity.

Parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri immediately took action. If Siniora is not allowed, then Berri will not have a quorum.


Side note: None of the parties are happy that Michel Sleiman will be elected president. Allegedly, only Michel Murr and the good people of Amchit are content with this decision.

Also, check this YouTube clip for a visual metaphor of the battle between the March 8 and 14 Coalitions.

Political Realignments and New Government Initiatives on the Horizon

Michael Young offers excellent analysis on the possible realignments of political alliances that could take place in the coming days and months.

Undoubtedly, Sleiman's election will boost the strength of Metn parliamentarian and local zaim Michel el-Murr, and reduce the popularity of Christian parliamentarian Michel Aoun. Sleiman and Aoun have similar bases of support, which will begin to realign themselves.

A few other possible developments:

1) a realignment of Christian politics in north Lebanon. The new electoral law will dramatically empower local zaim Sleiman Franjieh, excite the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and might allow the return to politics of Orthodox Christian billionaire Issam Fares. March 14 northern Christian figures who will likely try to continue serving in politics - like Boutros Harb, Nayla Mouawad, Elias Attallah, and Farid Mkari, and probably unlike Samir Franjieh - will have to readjust, realign, and perhaps even run in different electoral districts (ie, one March 14 Maronite will align him or herself with the Tripoli Sunni politicians to take the Maronite seat there, which is currently held by Elias Attallah).

2) a realignment of north Lebanon Sunni politics.

a. Tripoli is home to a number of billionaires. Former interim prime minister Najib Miqati mounted a publicity campaign a few months ago, which might be an early effort to return to politics. His portrait can be seen all over the city, often in the company of images of Rafiq al Hariri and the mayor of Tripoli, and sometimes alongside images of executed former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The Future Movement has strong support in Tripoli, but the coalition of independent Sunni leaders like Miqati and billionaire Muhammad Safadi could force Future to make bigger compromises than in 2005.

b. the Tripoli Sunni billionaires club might push for a larger role in the Lebanese economy. Under Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri, there was talk of making Tripoli into a free-zone similar to that in Dubai's Jebel Ali and what is intended for Aqaba, Jordan. There has been discussion recently of re-opening the Qleiaat Airport, despite a few constraints.

c. The Sunni region of Akkar, close to Tripoli, is Lebanon's poorest, and has the highest birthrates. Many residents of Akkar serve in the Lebanese Army, and they might receive greater attention from President Sleiman and Future leader and possibly soon-to-be prime minister Saad Hariri. Economic aid and government support for Akkar is desperately needed. Of parallel concern is that Akkar and Tripoli are hotbeds of Islamic extremism, including some groups with ideologies similar to Fatah al Islam.

d. The north Lebanon region could become extremely productive very soon. The province of Koura is agriculturally fertile. Tourism to Bcherre, Douma, Batroun, and Tripoli will aid the local economies. Chekka is a major site of industry and concrete production. Minor government efforts for greater transportation and integration between the countryside and Tripoli could spur even greater private investment from the wealthy Lebanese community abroad.


3) if Sleiman is smart, he will start building a support network in Jbeil. Outside of Roger Edde's investments in the city of Jbeil, the rest of the region receives scant attention from the Lebanese government. The Lebanese Ministry of Tourism fails to promote the myriad tourist attractions in the region, like:

a. excellent spelunking, camping, and hiking in Afqa;
b. skiing in Laqlouq;
c. the riverside restaurants in Nahr Ibrahim;
d. development opportunities for the beaches and seaside communities between Byblos and Batroun;
e. the multitude of religious and pilgrimage sites including the Mar Charbel monasteries, and the many Shia religious schools.

4) What will happen in the Bekaa? Unfortunately, I see little hope on the horizon for my region. The area will likely continue stagnating.

a. Hezbollah's security zones will prevent any major real estate development in the region.
b. The Salafists in the central will continue to worry the Christians and Shia.
c. The Armenians in Anjar continue to leave at a steady pace.
d. The Beirut-Damascus highway is still a 2 lane road in many places, and probably won't be a major priority for a number of years.
e. Wine companies continue to pop up and the old standards are increasing production, but unless the alcohol tax and the value-added taxes are reduced on wine exports, the industry will continue to rely on the relatively low level of domestic consumption. Remember that a good portion of the Lebanese population does not consume alcohol, and when they do, it is Almaza, 961 beer, araq, whiskey, and imported wine and spirits. Given the state of the Lebanese economy and the increasing cost of food, wine is not the first concern of most Lebanese shoppers.
One sign of hope: 961 Beer is working with German aid organizations to teach Lebanese farmers in Bekaa to grow hops. Allegedly, this will solve multiple problems simultaneously:
i. provide hops to the nascent Lebanese beer industry;
ii. provide Lebanese farmers with steady revenue from an agricultural product that is currently rising in price and already extremely expensive;
iii. reduce the incentive to grow hashish and other illegal substances. Allegedly, hops is worth more than hashish. Given the legality of the product, the farmers will receive greater local payment, not have to pay protection money to thugs and corrupt officials, reduce alliance on local tough guys, like Hezbollah, and have an incentive to make long-term plans for their farms given that they will no longer have to worry about their crops being burned or their property being seized.

Hezbollah's New Talking Points

According to a Hezbollah source, after General Michel Sleiman is elected president:

1) the tribunal to try the assassins of former prime minister Rafiq al Hariri will have the full support of Hezbollah and the 8 March parties, and will proceed;

2) the Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails will be released;

3) the Syrians will sign the documents the government of Fouad Siniora sent them that will end any dispute over the ownership of the Shebaa Farms;

4) Hezbollah will reveal their deal with the Israelis over a prisoner exchange;

5) and after these three steps are taken, Hezbollah will integrate its weapons into the Lebanese Army. There will be an armistice with Israel. Hezbollah will no longer fight from south Lebanon, but move its operations, training, and strategies to Gaza and the West Bank.

According to him, the Syrians refused to sign any agreement with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his government, but they will cooperate with Sleiman and the national-unity government.

Hezbollah and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah tell extremely convincing stories. Their narrative is easy to follow, rational, and easy to comprehend. They hit on many themes that are true, like the corruption of some March 14 leaders, and make it appear as if everything would be fine if Hezbollah was in charge. Their members are true believers, and their passion and conviction is evident.

I wish what this man tells me is true. His talking points will please any Lebanese audience. Unfortunately, what is more likely to happen is that Hezbollah will pound these points into everyone's heads, and then they will use a minor excuse - like appointing a certain judge to the tribunal judiciary, or the Future Movement not allowing Michel Aoun to appoint Shia ministers (which is a bad thing, but allegedly happened in 2005) - to cancel everything out.

Who won?

The 14 March Coalition and the Arab League got a president elected before 2009, the year the Iranians predicted someone would ascend to that office.

The opposition got much more than their request of 1/3 veto wielding power in the Lebanese cabinet of ministers.

Hariri will protect his...ahem, our tribunal. Hezbollah's telephone lines were never really threatened in the first place, which means that their "divine" weapons will remain theirs, not ours.

The most important 14 March goals should be:

1) Complete government transparency;
2) Continue meeting the demands of the Paris-III donor countries.

These two demands will help keep 14 March Coalition members true to their democratic rhetoric and minimize graft within the ranks, while it will be an open threat to opposition ministers that this is not the Syrian era.

The opposition should come up with some goals of their own.

I'd love to see a war of ministries in which one ministry monitors another to make sure that it is transparent.

I would also love to see 8 March leaders force out a corrupt 14 March minister, and likewise.

The goal right now for Lebanese citizens is to make sure that the Lebanese government is working for the people, and prove that the government is not just an agreement between rich, gun-wielding fat cats who turn a blind eye on each others corrupt activities.

All Over?

The Doha negotiations were never meant to solve everything. They were meant to stall the violence until after the summer tourist season is over.

Lebanon now has a concensus president to provide legitimacy to Lebanese "democracy." Now, all Lebanese leaders can appeal to their foreign sponsors for more money. The businesses owned by these same leaders will profit from the Lebanese community abroad and brave foreign tourists who descend on Beirut this summer to party before the fighting starts again.

At least civilian lives will be spared...



My prediction: there won't be major clashes until the late fall. In late September or October, grumbling will begin. Then, some group will threaten to take to the streets. Then, a protest will occur, but it won't get violent. However, the government will be deadlocked, and everyone will be unhappy.

In November, Syrian and Iranian leaders will watch the American elections closely, and then listen to statements from the victor. They will begin planning, but won't take action until Bush is safely out of office and does not have the authority to go to war.

January 2009, tensions will increase, most of it having to do with the electoral law and the timing of the elections.

Then again, this is Lebanon. No one expected Nahr al Bared. Something else might pop up this summer.

The Doha Negotiations

The Lebanese press should have been banned from Qatar. Lebanese politicians should have been banned from calling the Lebanese press from their Qatar hotel rooms.

Negotiations are occuring in Qatar, and in negotiations the participating parties use strategies and tactics to win concessions. Inflaming Lebanese civilians and using the biased and propaganda spinning Lebanese media to effect the outsome of negotiations is only harmful to Lebanon, and a useless ploy against the other negotiating parties who all have media outlets of their own.

Politics is Lebanon's national drama, and all I've heard over the last few days are people commenting on the different tactics in Doha, and deciding to take some action in Beirut based on what they hear on the radio. It is ridiculous.

Minute by minute accounts don't matter. Keep it secret, and let some aide to Elie Skaff make a million dollars publishing a behind-the-scenes account of the events in a book published this August.

The blame game shouldn't happen in the middle of negotiations. Of course, one side will be mad at one point, and the other side will counter and make an entirely different group angry. That's what happens during negotiations. In the rest of the world, there is no Syria to step in and decide when it's time to stop debating. It is not acceptable to leave the office of the president vacant.

The point of negotiations is to figure out a way to live and work together. If that is not possible, then start figuring out a way for us not to have to live together, but do not come back without a decision that leaves us civilians in sectarian jeopardy. Do not fail to agree on something and then sacrifice our lives for your tribunals, "Divine" weapons, ministries of theft, presidencies you think belong only to you, and the foreign overlords who give you money and weapons.

Covering Lebanon

It is difficult to cover Lebanon. Most Lebanese don't understand their country. Political parties mount disinformation campaigns. Politicians claim one thing publicly, but do another. Other politicians make a proposal to provoke a response out of an opponent so that the politician can do something different than what is proposed today. Many political analysts and university professors are aligned with political movements and publish extremely biased polling data and articles in which they don't even get the facts right.

The LA Times tries to explore myriad facets of the Middle East. I regularly read their blog Babylon & Beyond. The blog covers myriad topics that rarely receive attention. Recently, I took the LAT to task for insinuating that a Sunni militia fought against Hezbollah during the recent clashes. They investigated the story further.

According to the general definition of "militia," one can argue that there was a Sunni militia. A group of armed men tried to protect their area. However, there are a few problems with publishing an article that says this:

1) the word "militia" in Lebanon is highly politicized. This should come as no surprise given the history of the Lebanese civil war.

Amal gunmen marauded through the streets of Beirut, but were in high dudgeon over al-Arabiya referring to these gunmen taking over neighborhoods in a planned manner within a supervised hierarchy as a militia. If Amal, which was actively controlling and possessing Beirut neighborhood, looting private property, and preventing the free movement of citizens, took issues with the word "militia," then might the Future Movement, which did not participate in fighting in the same kind of coordinated way as Hezbollah, Amal, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party?

Hezbollah's al-Manar TV routinely referred to their armed allies in the streets as "parties," whereas they referred to other political parties as "militias." The Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces (which had nothing to do with anything that occured in the streets of Beirut last week) were described as militias, not parties, even though they did not invade anyone.

2) the implications of the word "militia." Hezbollah is, without a doubt, a well-trained militia. It is better equipped and more capable than the Lebanese Army, however, it is a militia because the democratically elected Lebanese government does not control it and has no power over it. In fact, Hezbollah has a large degree of control over the Lebanese government.

If Hezbollah can portray other parties in Lebanon as militias, then it has a better chance of justifying its own existence. If Hezbollah and its allies are the only armed factions, then it becomes much more difficult to justify possessing those weapons, especially when the weapons are being used to undermine the authority of the Lebanese government, Army, police, and other institutions. Many Hezbollah supporting friends cited the LAT piece to justify their claims about Saad Hariri having a militia.

3) coordination and training. Lebanon has a brisk economy around security companies. These are not Israeli, South African, British SAS, Blackwater style security companies that pay their employees hundreds of thousands of dollars to do whatever is necessary to protect billionaires and oil rigs. These are companies that provide minimum wage security guards to pat down men's waistbands and inspect women's purses. They also use little television antennas on sticks to screen cars for explosive chemicals (which I've been told by a UN security official are not effective).

SecurePlus is a Sunni owned security firm. It does not provide paramilitary training. The security guards they train do not even carry guns.

It is unfair to portray SecurePlus as being on the same level as Hezbollah, which has myriad training camps, launches wars and operations, and actively cooperates with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Whether the LAT wanted to or not, it entered into a dangerous Lebanese debate and aided the arguments of one side against another without helping to illuminate the truth.

Were there Sunni gunmen on the streets of Beirut? Yes.

Did they invade other neighborhoods? No, they primarily tried to protect their areas.

Were they trained to fight wars? No, the 8 year old with a gun on a motorscooter killed by Hezbollah fighters was not trained. He aimed his weapon at an invading force because the Army and police refused to do so. His community and leaders recognized that the actions the boy took were wrong and said so publicly, unlike the leaders of the men who killed the child.

Can the Sunni gunmen launch a war against Israel, should they choose? No, they have kalashnikovs, but did not appear to have the sophisticated telecommunications devices Hezbollah used. They do not have their own phone network to use in fighting against other Lebanese and Israel.

Could Sunni gunmen run through the streets of Beirut misbehaving the way Amal and the SSNP did? Sure, but the Lebanese Army would stop them. They would probably need the cover that Hezbollah provided Amal and the SSNP to get away with similar lunacy.

The Psychological Effects of War

I have no concrete evidence of what I claim; only the anecdotes of friends and associates. Given that aid organizations and academics have yet to fully chronical the effects of the 2006 war, I think anecdotal evidence will have to do for now.

Clenched Jaws and Chipped Teeth
I have heard many occurences of jaw problems. Some residents of Beirut are clenching their teeth to the degree that it hurts to chew. I have heard many reports of jaw aches. A couple I know say each separately wake up at night because their spouse is grinding his/her teeth so loudly.

A dentist told me that he is making many nightguards and repairing chipped teeth. He claims that Lebanese are giving themselves long-term tooth and jaw damage from stress. A friend started wearing a mouthguard when he runs because he can't stop clenching his jaw. He already chipped away half a tooth.

Pills
A friend of mine in Hamra can't sleep. His mother and sister can't sleep, either. Abed is a leftist, environmentalist, and skeptic, so he refuses to medicate. The rest of his family take pills. They can't sleep without them.